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FEDERALISM, VARIATION, AND STATE 
REGULATION OF FRANCHISE TERMINATION 
 
JONATHAN KLICK* 
 
BRUCE KOBAYASHI† 
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Abstract 
This article discusses and expands on our recent work 
examining the effects of franchise-termination laws.  In a 
prior article, we examined empirically the effect of 
franchise-termination laws on the level of franchise 
activity.  Our analysis improved upon the prior literature in 
two major ways.  First, our work exploited two new sources 
of panel data to provide new empirical evidence on the 
effect of franchise termination laws.  Second, our analysis 
examined variation in states’ restrictions on the ability of 
franchisors and franchisees to contract around a particular 
state’s regulation.  We found that the effects of termination 
laws on the overall level of franchise activity are negligible 
when states do not limit the parties’ ability to contract 
around the laws, but become significant when states 
impose such limits.  Our results show that contracting 
parties’ ability to exit from a state’s regulations is a 
significant factor in determining the effect of regulation, 
and should be taken into account by policy makers.  It also 
demonstrates the importance of taking state variation into 
account when analyzing the effect of state regulation.  This 
article further examines these issues.   We discuss the 
policy issues related to contractual exit from state 
regulation.  In addition, we present further evidence on the 
effects of variation in franchise regulation by examining 
the marginal effect of giving franchisees a right to cure 
violations. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Economists have studied several fundamental franchising issues 
central to the theory of the firm.1  These include the general nature of intra- 
versus inter-firm contracting and how contracts and incentives are used to 
reduce transactions and agency costs.2  Economists have also studied how 
the regulation of the contractual relationship between franchisors and 
franchisees affects contracting, the organization of firms, and consumers.3   
The franchisor’s ability to terminate franchisees is a central focus 
of both the theoretical and empirical literature on franchise contracts and 
their regulation.  The franchisor's ability to terminate shirking franchisees is 
an important self-enforcement mechanism for reducing monitoring and 
other agency costs.  But broad termination powers may allow franchisors to 
opportunistically take over non-shirking franchisees. Responding to the 
latter possibility, some states and the federal government enacted various 
types of legislation aimed at regulating franchisor opportunism.  State 
regulation varies in important ways.4  Moreover, most states did not enact 
statutes, choosing instead to use state contract law and state common law to 
resolve such disputes.5  The federal government acted only in the specific 
areas of gas stations and automobile dealers.6  Thus, the regulation of 
franchise termination has remained largely a state law issue.  
The variation in the states’ regulatory response, as well as the 
federal government’s partial regulation of the area, is important mainly for 
two reasons.  First, the absence of broad federal regulation and the states’ 
non-uniform approach to regulating the franchise contract has enabled 
                                                          
1 Paul H. Rubin, The Theory of the Firm and the Structure of the Franchise Contract, 
21 J.L. & ECON. 223 (1978). 
2 See generally, ROGER D. BLAIR & FRANCINE LAFONTAINE, THE ECONOMICS OF 
FRANCHISING, (Cambridge 2005); Francine Lafontaine & Scott E. Masten, Franchise 
Contracting, Organization, and Regulation: Introduction, 2 J. CORP. FIN. 1 (1995); 
Benjamin Klein, The Economics of Franchise Contracts, 2 J. CORP. FIN. 9 (1995). 
3 James A. Brickley, Frederick H. Dark & Michael S. Weisbach, The Economic Effects 
of Franchise Termination Laws, 34 J.L. & ECON. 101 (1991); J. Howard Beales III & 
Timothy J. Muris, The Foundations of Franchise Regulation:  Issues and Evidence, 2 J. 
CORP. FIN. 157 (1995) (examining state regulation of the franchise contract); Howard P. 
Marvel, Tying, Franchising, and Gasoline Service Stations, 2 J. CORP. FIN. 199 (1995) 
(examining FTC regulation of gasoline franchising); Richard L. Smith II, Franchise 
Regulation: An Economic Analysis of State Restrictions on Automobile Distribution, 25 
J.L. & ECON. 125 (1982); E. W. Eckard, Jr., The Effects of State Automobile Dealer 
Entry Regulation on New Car Prices, 23 ECON. INQ. 223 (1985) (examining state 
regulation of automobile dealers). 
4 See infra Section III. 
5 BLAIR AND LAFONTAINE, supra note 2 at 276-78; see Timothy J. Muris, Opportunistic 
Behavior and the Law of Contracts, 65 MINN. L. REV. 521 (1981). 
6 See Federal Automotive Dealer Franchise Act (“FADFA”), 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1221-25 
(2000); Petroleum Marketing Practices Act (“PMPA”), 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 2801-06 (2000 
& Supp. 2007).  
 2009] Federalism, Variation, and State Regulation of Franchise 
Termination 
 
 
 
357 
economists to use this variation to measure the empirical effect of state 
regulations.7  Second, state variation has allowed the forces of competitive 
federalism to operate in this area.8  Franchisors have been able to use 
contractual choice-of-law and choice-of-forum clauses to select the law and 
courts of non-regulating states, thereby avoiding the effect of regulation.9  
If these regulations interfere with efficient contracting, the contracting 
parties’ ability to avoid regulating jurisdictions can increase welfare.  
Variation in state treatment of contractual choice-of-law and choice-of-
forum clauses also facilitates empirical measurement of the effect of these 
clauses.10 
This article summarizes and extends our prior work on franchising 
and the economics of federalism.  Specifically, this article examines the use 
of contractual choice-of-law and choice-of-forum clauses in franchise 
contracts to avoid regulating jurisdictions.   We show that firms’ ability to 
use contractual choice-of-law and choice-of-forum to avoid regulating 
states is an important theoretical consideration in predicting the effect of 
state franchise statutes.   
The article also summarizes our prior empirical work on franchise 
regulation, which explicitly examines variation in states’ approaches to 
regulating franchise contracts, including enforcement of choice-of-law and 
choice-of-forum clauses.  Consistent with our theoretical work, we find that 
variations in states’ treatment of choice-of-law and choice-of-forum clauses 
help explain the effects of state franchise regulation.   
Finally, this article adds to the empirical literature on the effects of 
franchise regulation by further examining variation in the franchise statutes.  
Specifically, this article extends our prior work by showing the marginal 
effect of a statutory right to cure.   
 The analysis proceeds as follows.  Section II provides a brief 
review of the theoretical and empirical literature on the economics of 
franchising.  Section III examines variation in state franchise regulation 
statutes and prior empirical work on franchise regulation.  Section IV 
discusses the economics of federalism and the use of contractual choice-of-
law and choice-of-forum clauses in franchise contracts.  Section V 
summarizes our prior empirical work on franchise regulation, and extends 
this analysis to examine the marginal effect of a statutory right to cure.  
                                                          
7Jonathan Klick, Bruce H. Kobayashi, & Larry E. Ribstein, The Effect of Contract 
Regulation: The Case of Franchising, George Mason Univ. Law & Econ. Research, 
Paper No. 07-03, 2006, available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=951464 (last visited Mar. 14, 2009). 
8 Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Contract and Jurisdictional Freedom, in 
THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 325, 348-49 (F.H. Buckley ed., 1999). 
9 Id.; see also infra Section IV. 
10 See Klick et al., supra note 7. 
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Section VI concludes this paper.  
 
II. THE ECONOMICS OF FRANCHISE CONTRACTS 
 
Economists have applied the insights of transaction-cost economics 
to explain the use of franchising as a business form.  Rubin argued that 
existing explanations for the franchise form based on capital constraints 
were implausible.  He found more guidance in Coase’s work on the theory 
of the firm,11 which better explained the franchise form of contract and 
business decisions whether to franchise or own outlets.12  Drawing on the 
agency cost insights of the economic literature,13 Rubin’s model of 
franchising explains the decision to use the franchise form and the structure 
of the franchise contract as a way to reduce monitoring costs and agency 
costs.   Specifically, firms use franchising in situations where direct 
monitoring of the unit would be costly, as for units located far from the 
franchisor.14   
Moreover, the structure of the franchise contract can be explained 
as an attempt by the contracting parties to generate joint surplus by 
encouraging the parties to invest optimally in the franchised establishment. 
The franchisee gets a share of the franchise revenues, thereby reducing the 
franchisor's need to monitor the franchisee. The franchisor is also motivated 
to provide on-going support, such as advertising, by receiving a share of 
revenues either directly or indirectly through contractual provisions 
requiring the franchisee to purchase its supplies from the franchisor, at 
above marginal cost.15     
                                                          
11 Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).  
12 Rubin, supra note 1. 
13 Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz. Production, Information Costs, and Economic 
Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972); Michael C. Jensen & William H. 
Meckling, Theory of the Firm:  Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership 
Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). 
14 James A. Brickley & Frederick H. Dark, The Choice of Organizational Form: The 
Case of Franchising, 18 J. FIN. ECON. 401 (1987) (evidence supporting hypothesis that 
owning versus franchising decision reflects a trade-off among agency related 
problems). 
15 For a formal model of this “double sided moral hazard” problem, see Sugato 
Bhattacharyya & Francine Lafontaine, Double-Sided Moral Hazard and the Nature of 
Share Contracts, 26 RAND. J. ECON. 761, 771-73 (1995) (showing how the need for 
these incentive effects leads to linear revenue sharing formulas in franchise contracts).  
For empirical studies presenting evidence consistent with the double moral hazard 
model, see Francine Lafontaine, Agency Theory and Franchising: Some Empirical 
Results, 23 RAND J. ECON. 263, 275-81 (1992) (finding that the observed degree of 
franchising among franchisors is consistent with this model); Francine Lafontaine & 
Kathryn Shaw, The Dynamics of Franchise Contracting: Evidence from Panel Data, 
107 J. POL. ECON. 1041 (1999) (using panel data on franchise contract terms to show 
support for the double sided moral hazard model).  
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The franchise contract, like any long-term contract, still gives the 
parties room to act opportunistically.16  In the absence of effective 
monitoring and incentives, franchisees will attempt to free ride on efforts by 
the franchisor and other franchisees to maintain the brand, because they do 
not bear a significant loss in the value of the franchise trademark when they 
fail to uphold the franchisor’s quality standards.17    
The contracting challenge this potential opportunism presents is 
that it is impossible to define the franchisees' performance standards in 
perfect detail under all contingencies and, therefore, impossible to enforce 
these standards in court.  One way to deal with this problem is through self-
enforcement mechanisms that give the franchisee a positive rent stream that 
will be taken away if he does not perform as expected and is terminated.18  
Thus, the franchisor’s power to terminate shirking franchisees allows for 
better quality control and greater total surplus, thereby making the 
franchisor and franchisees collectively better off than they would be if the 
franchisee had more freedom to behave opportunistically.19  Conversely, 
regulation of termination clauses that prevent or delay franchisors from 
disciplining underperforming franchisees by terminating their contract 
would weaken the effectiveness of this self-enforcement mechanism. 
However, broad termination rights have the potential to generate a 
different kind of opportunism by allowing franchisors to take over 
                                                          
16See generally, Benjamin Klein, Robert G. Crawford & Armen A. Alchian, Vertical 
Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & 
ECON. 297 (1978); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF 
CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING 52-56 (1985); Benjamin 
Klein, Why Hold-Ups Occur: The Self-Enforcing Range of Contractual Relationships, 
34 ECON. INQ. 444 (1996).  
17 See Rubin, supra note 1; Klein, supra note 2; Benjamin Klein, Transaction Costs 
Determinants of ‘Unfair’ Contractual Arrangements, 70 AM. ECON. REV. 356 (1980). 
18 See generally, Benjamin Klein & Keith B. Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in 
Assuring Contractual Performance, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615 (1981) (empirical studies of 
franchise contracts are consistent with this incentive/agency model); Patrick J. 
Kaufmann & Francine Lafontaine, Costs of Control: The Source of Economic Rents for 
McDonald's Franchisees, 37 J.L. & ECON. 417 (1994) (showing that McDonald’s 
franchisees retain ex-ante rents); James A. Brickley, Sanjog Misra & R. Lawrence Van 
Horn, Contract Duration: Evidence from Franchising, 49 J.L. & ECON. 173 (2006) 
(finding contract duration in franchise contracts is positively related to franchisee’s 
level of specific investments); James A. Brickley, Incentive Conflicts and Contractual 
Restraints: Evidence from Franchising, 42 J.L. & ECON. 745 (1999) (examining 
incidence of specific contractual provisions in franchise contracts).  See also Brickley & 
Dark, supra note 14; James A. Brickley, Frederick H. Dark & Michael S. Weisbach, An 
Agency Perspective on Franchising, 20 FIN. MGMT. 27 (1991); G. Frank Mathewson & 
Ralph A. Winter, The Economics of Franchise Contracts. 28 J.L. & ECON. 503 (1985); 
Seth W. Norton, Franchising, Labor Productivity, and the New Institutional 
Economics, 145 J. INST. & THEORETICAL ECON. 578 (1989).  
19 For an early exposition of this argument, see Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability: 
A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J.L. & ECON. 293 (1975). 
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profitable franchises, even where the franchisee is not shirking.20   By 
exercising termination rights in markets that turn out to be unexpectedly 
profitable, the franchisor can expropriate returns from a non-shirking 
franchisee’s investment in market discovery and development.  In other 
words, the franchisor can “skim the cream” by taking the franchises that 
turn out to be the best.  This denies the franchisee the benefits it expected 
under the contract by allowing the franchisor to serve the same market 
without having to split revenues with a franchisee or to profit from a resale 
of the franchise.  
Franchisors’ incentives to engage in opportunistic “cream 
skimming” behavior can be tempered by reputational penalties.  
Opportunistic franchisors will face increased costs of selling new franchises 
unless the price of the franchise is lowered to reflect the increased “cream 
skimming” risk.  Indeed, these penalties help explain why franchise 
contracts contain termination-at-will and other mechanisms for constraining 
franchisee opportunism, despite the risk of opportunism by franchisors.21 
Empirical evidence on franchise operations and termination suggest 
that while franchisors may act opportunistically, that is not likely to be the 
main reason they terminate or decide not to renew franchises.22  The “cream 
skimming” theory suggests that franchisors would tend to terminate units 
that become profitable unexpectedly.  Yet there is evidence that one-third of 
contract terminations resulted in the outlet being closed, and that contract 
termination actions were likely to involve underperforming outlets.23   
Moreover, since the unprofitable units cannot be sustained, the “cream 
skimming” hypothesis predicts that established franchises would tend to 
become company-owned over time.   Yet the data show no such tendency.24   
 
III. STATE FRANCHISE REGULATION 
 
Concerns about franchisor opportunism led many states to limit 
franchisor termination rights by statute beginning in the early 1970s.25  
Between 1971 and 1992, nineteen jurisdictions enacted laws regulating 
                                                          
20 See, e.g., Gillian K. Hadfield, Problematic Relations: Franchising and the Law of 
Incomplete Contracts, 42 STAN. L. REV. 927 (1990). 
21 See Klein, supra note 17, at 360. 
22 See Blair & Lafontaine, supra, note 2, at 271-75. 
23 Darrell L. Williams, Franchise Contract Termination: Is There Evidence of 
Franchisor Abuse?, in TENTH ANNUAL PROCEEDINGS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 
OF FRANCHISING (A. Dugan, ed., 1996).  See also BLAIR & LAFONTAINE, supra note 2, 
at 271-75. 
24 Id. at 273; Lafontaine & Shaw, supra note 15. 
25 Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 8; Jason Stover, No Cure, No Problem: State 
Franchise Laws and Termination for Incurable Defaults, 23 FRANCHISE L. J. 217 
(2004). 
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franchisors’ ability to terminate franchise contracts.26  Table 1 lists the 
states that have enacted general statutory restrictions on franchise 
termination, non-renewal of franchise contracts, and these statutes’ 
substantive provisions.  The states’ regulatory response varied in several 
important ways.  First, while nineteen jurisdictions passed general 
franchise-protection statutes that regulated termination, most jurisdictions 
did not do so.  Second, while most statutes require good cause for a 
franchisor to terminate its contract, such as violation of specific contract 
terms or fraud on the part of the franchisee, two statutes require only 
notice.27  Third, eleven statutes give the franchisee a right to cure any cause 
for termination raised by the franchisor.  Giving franchisees a right to cure 
removes the threat of immediate termination and may further erode the 
potential disciplinary effect of the termination threat; in addition, there are 
other sources of variation.  Fourth, some statutes protect franchisees from 
potential encroachment of new franchises on their territory.28  Fifth, some 
statutes restrict enforcement of contractual provisions waiving franchisee 
protection and contracting for the applicable law and forum.29 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
26 Rhode Island recently enacted a statute that regulated termination of franchisees.  See 
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-50-4 (2007).  In addition, Federal law regulates specific types of 
franchise relationships—automobile franchises under FADFA (15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-
1225), which imposes a general duty of good faith, and gasoline franchises under the 
Petroleum Marketing Practices Act (“PMPA”) (15 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2806). These laws 
may primarily benefit franchisors to the extent that they preempt state law and thereby 
protect franchisors from more onerous state regulation.  However, states can enact 
significant regulations beyond those contained in the federal statutes.  For example, 
state regulation of automobile dealerships is far more extensive that those contained in 
the FADFA or the states’ general regulation of franchises enacted in almost every 
jurisdiction.  The PMPA did not preempt a preexisting law in Maryland that prohibits 
refiner control of retail gasoline stations (MD. CODE ANN., [BUS. REG.] § 10-311 
(LexisNexis 2004)), and would not prevent the enactment of similar laws in other states 
(Delaware and the District of Columbia have enacted similar laws (DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 
6, § 2905(a) (1974), D.C. CODE ANN. § 36-302.02 (2001)). 
27 All of the statutes require that notice be given to the franchisee up to 180 days before 
the relationship is terminated.  In addition, the vast majority of these statutes (i.e., all 
states with termination statutes except IL, MI, VA, and WA) apply to a franchisor’s 
decision not to renew a franchisee’s contract as well.  See supra Table 1. 
28A very restrictive encroachment provision was a unique feature of the Iowa statute, 
passed in 1992.  However, this provision was relaxed 1995.  See IOWA CODE § 523H.6 
(2007).  Analyses of anti-encroachment provisions contained in state automobile dealer 
regulations show that these provisions operate to prevent manufactures from solving the 
successive monopoly problem, and result in higher prices to consumers.  See Smith, 
supra note 3; Eckard, supra note 3. 
29 These variations are discussed in detail below, and are listed infra in Table 2. 
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Table 1 - State Regulation of the Franchisor/Franchisee Relationship 
 
STATE STATUTE CAUSE 
REQUIRED 
FOR 
TERMINA-
TION 
RIGHT TO 
CURE 
CAUSE 
REQUIRED 
FOR NON-
RENEWAL 
NOTICE  OTHER 
STATU-
TORY 
RESTRIC-
TIONS  
1. AR 
 
(eff. 3/4/77) 
AR STAT. 
ANN 
4-72-204 
YES 30 days. 
10 Days if 
a, b. 
None if c, d, 
e, f, g, h.  
YES* 
 
90 days - 
R/T 
 
2. CA 
(eff. 
10/1/80;Op. 
1/1/81) 
CA BUS. 
& PROF. 
CODE @ 
20020 
YES 30 days 
None if  a, 
c, d, e, f, g, 
h. 
NONE**, 
***- 
180 days 
R  
 
3. CT 
(eff. 
10/1/72) 
CT GEN. 
STAT. @ 
42-133f 
YES NONE YES 60 days 
T/R  
30 days 
if c 
None if 
d 
6 mo R 
if g 
 
4. DC 
(eff. 
4/16/89; 
repealed 
4/29/98) 
D.C. 
CODE @ 
29-1201 
YES 60 days YES 60 days 
T/R 
15 days 
if c. 
None if 
d. 
 
5.DE*/* 
(1970) 
6 DEL C. 
@ 2552 
YES NONE YES 90 days  
6.HI*/* 
(1974) 
HRS @ 
482E-6 
YES Reasonable 
Period 
YES* Reason-
able 
Period 
 
7. IA*/* 
(1992)  
ICA s 
523H.7 
YES Reasonable 
Period 
None if a, c, 
d, f. 
 
YES Reason-
able 
Period 
Indepen-
dent 
Sourcing, 
Liability for 
Encroach-
ment 
8. IL 
(eff. 
1/1/98)*/** 
815 ILCS 
705/19 
YES 30 days,  
None if a, c, 
d, f. 
NONE 30 days 
T 
60 days 
R 
 
9. IN 
(eff. 7/1/76) 
IN ST. 23-
2-2.7 
YES NONE YES* 90 days 
R/T 
Indepen-
dent  
Sourcing, 
Liability for 
Encroach-
ment. 
10. MI 
(eff. 10/15 
/84) 
MCLA 
445.1527 
 
YES 30 days NONE 30 days 
T 
 
11. MN 
(eff. 7/1/81) 
MSA  
s80C.14 
YES 60 days 
None if a, c, 
d. 
 
NONE** 90 days 
T 
180 days 
R 
 
12. MO 
(1974) 
MO ST 
407.405 
NONE NONE NONE 90 days - 
R/T 
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None if 
c, d, f, h. 
13. MS 
(eff. 7/1/75) 
MS ST 
s75-24 
NONE NONE NONE 90 days - 
R/T 
None if 
c, d, f, h. 
 
14. NE 
(1978) 
 
RRS Neb 
@ 87-404 
YES NONE YES 60 days - 
R/T 
15 days 
if c 
None if 
d, f, g, h. 
 
15. NJ 
(eff. 
12/21/71) 
NJSA 
56:10-5 
YES NONE YES 60 days - 
R/T 
15 days 
if c. 
None if 
d 
 
16. TN 
(1989) 
TCA 47-
25-150B 
YES 30 days, 
non if c, d, 
f. 
YES 60 days  
17. VA 
(1972) 
VA ST s 
13.1-564 
YES NONE NONE NONE  
18. WA 
(1971) 
RCWA 
19.100.180 
YES 30 days or 
substantial 
& 
continuing 
action to 
cure. 
None if a, c, 
d, f. 
NONE 30 days  
19. WI 
(eff. 4/5/74) 
WSA 
135.03 
YES 60 days, 
10 days if h 
YES 90 days 
R/T 
None if f 
Cause 
applies to 
"substan-
tial change 
in competi-
tive circum-
stances." 
 
NOTES: 
Exceptions: 
a - Repeated failure to comply with non-discriminatory or reasonable requirements 
b - Repeated failure to act in good faith/commercially reasonable manner 
c - Abandonment 
d - Criminal Conduct/fraud 
e - Impairs Franchisor's Trademark 
f - Insolvency/Bankruptcy 
g - Loss of right to occupy premises 
h - Failure to pay/insufficient funds/ no account check 
 
* Not required for non-renewal reflecting reasonable/standard policies or practices 
of franchisor. 
** Non-Renewal cannot be for the purpose of converting franchise to franchisor 
operated outlet 
*** Must give franchisee opportunity to sell & franchisor has right of first refusal. 
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*/* DE and HI statutes were amended, but do not know if substantive or technical. 
DE amended 62 Laws 1980, ch. 352 Section 4, HI amended 1978).  IA statute 
applies different but similar section to franchise contracts entered into after 
7/1/2000 (Section 523H.2A). 
*/** Prior IL law reflecting termination, Public Act 81-426, renumbered Public Act 
81-1509, effective 1980.  
 
There is a significant question regarding the net effect of these 
regulations on franchisors and franchisees. If the costs of franchisor 
opportunism are likely to outweigh those of franchisee opportunism, laws 
restricting termination rights could make both franchisors and franchisees 
better off.  For example, the law could encourage franchisees to invest more 
in market discovery and development by helping franchisors make 
commitments not to skim off the best franchises.  However, as discussed 
above, such regulations may not be necessary because of the availability of 
reputational and other market forces to police franchisor opportunism.  
Thus, the benefits of the laws in reducing “cream skimming” may be 
outweighed by their costs in preventing franchisors from disciplining 
shirking franchisees.   
 Given these questions regarding the net benefits of regulations, 
policymakers and scholars have been interested in measuring the actual 
effects of franchise regulation. Notably, Brickley et al. used the variation in 
the states’ choices on whether to enact franchise protection statues that 
restrict termination to test competing hypotheses regarding the effects of 
these regulations.30  Using cross-sectional regression analyses, they 
estimated the effect of these regulations by comparing the rate of 
franchising in states with and without such franchise protection statutes.  
The authors hypothesize that if termination clauses primarily discipline 
franchisee cheating, the effect of termination limit laws on the rate of 
franchising will be most pronounced in industries characterized by 
transient, non-repeat business.  Franchisors may not need the threat of 
termination in industries with significant repeat business because in this 
situation a franchisee that cheats on quality will lose local customers. By 
contrast, franchisees that rely on the franchise itself rather than on local 
reputation can impose costs on other outlets in the chain by shirking on 
quality, thereby making the potential for termination more important.  On 
the other hand, Brickley et al. hypothesize that if termination clauses 
primarily allow the franchisor to exploit the franchisee, restrictions on 
termination should not have different effects across industries.31  
 Brickley et al. show that the effect of termination restrictions is, in 
fact, greater in the industries they classify as particularly subject to non-
repeat customers (e.g., restaurants, hotels, and auto-rental agencies) than in 
                                                          
30 Brickley, supra note 3, at 117-126. 
31 Id. at 111. 
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other industries.32  Although their regressions do not show significant 
differences in the fraction of franchised units to total units between 
regulating and non-regulating states when all industries are included, the 
effect of regulation is negative and statistically significant when only non-
repeat industries and included.33  The authors conclude that their findings 
are consistent with the view that termination laws increase the costs of 
franchising, and reduce efficiency by preventing the contracting parties 
from optimally contracting regarding termination.34  
The Brickley et al. results are consistent with a large number of 
studies that have empirically demonstrated the negative effects of franchise 
and dealer regulation in other contexts.35  However, there are several 
limitations to the Brickley et al. empirical analysis.  First, the absence of 
widely available data has hindered the empirical study of the effects of 
varying levels of state regulation across different chains or industries.  It 
may be difficult to obtain data showing the effect of the regulation on the 
firm in any particular jurisdiction because neither firms nor the government 
produce widely available data that show how effects vary by industry, 
jurisdiction, and over time.  Brickley et al.’s data, collected by the U.S. 
Department of Commerce,36 did not allow them to isolate the shock of legal 
changes or remove the effects of differences between industries in states 
with termination restrictions and those without.  Moreover, the most recent 
                                                          
32 Id. at 123-26. 
33 Id. at 125. 
34 Id. at 125-26.  In addition, Brickley et al. perform an event study analysis of the stock 
price reaction of publicly traded franchisors to passage of the California Franchisee 
Protection Statues.  They find that the passage of the Act was associated with 
significant negative abnormal returns for these firms.  They conclude that these results 
are consistent with termination regulations that serve to increase the costs of 
franchising.  Id. at 126-30.  However, while the stock market event study captures 
losses to franchisors that result from the imposition of regulation, it cannot adequately 
distinguish losses resulting from reduced opportunism profits from those resulting from 
higher agency costs and deadweight losses from regulation.   
35 These include state regulation of automobile franchises and gasoline divorcement 
statutes.  See, e.g., Smith, supra note 3; Eckard, supra note 3 (finding that auto dealer 
regulations had anti-consumer effects); Michael G. Vita, Regulatory Restrictions on 
Vertical Integration and Control: The Competitive Impact of Gasoline Divorcement 
Policies, 18 J. REG. ECON. 217 (2000); John M. Barron & John R. Umbeck, The Effects 
of Different Contractual Arrangements: The Case of Retail Gasoline Markets, 27 J.L. & 
ECON. 313 (1984); Asher A. Blass & Dennis W. Carlton, The Choice of Organization 
Form in Gasoline Retailing and the Cost of Laws That Limit That Choice, 44 J.L. & 
ECON. 511 (2001) (noting the anticompetitive effects of gasoline divorcement 
regulations). 
36 See Beales & Muris, supra note 3; Brickley et al., supra note 3 (discussing the U.S. 
Department of Commerce’s publication, Franchising in the Economy, which collected 
data on franchising between 1979 and 1986).  
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data from this source is now over 20 years old because the federal 
government’s publication of the data ended in 1988.37   
Second, the authors’ analysis does not take into account significant 
differences in the regulating states’ approaches to regulation of franchise 
termination, such as whether the franchisee is given a right to cure 
violations and the states’ differential treatment of contractual waiver.38  The 
relevant statute may allow contracts between the parties to waive the 
regulation,39 apply a more permissive law to the interpretation or 
enforcement of the contract,40 or to have cases arising out of the contract 
adjudicated in a jurisdiction other than the one that imposes the regulation, 
where the court may apply its own or a third jurisdiction’s more permissive 
law.41  The potential for such bargaining and variation in states’ treatment 
of such bargaining can be a significant factor in determining how state 
regulations affect the franchisee-franchisor relationship. 
 
IV. FEDERALISM AND CONTRACTUAL AVOIDANCE OF REGULATION 
 
 Even if state franchise termination regulation can harm contracting 
parties, they may not do so because contracting parties have several ways to 
minimize or even completely negate the effect of costly regulations,42 
thereby achieving beneficial flexibility.43  Thus, the actual effect of states’ 
regulations on contracting parties can be trivial.44 
States’ enforcement of contracts also has implications for the 
effectiveness of competitive federalism.  Effective regulatory competition 
between states can improve the efficiency of state regulation by improving 
legislators’ incentives to produce efficient law and deterring legislative 
                                                          
37 See, e.g., Brickley et al., supra note 3. 
38 Existing studies have explicitly analyzed how bargaining between the parties affects 
the terms of the franchise contract.  See, e.g., Seth W. Norton, The Coase Theorem and 
Suboptimization in Marketing Channels, 6 MARKETING SCI. 268 (1987).  However, 
these analyses generally have not considered bargaining over whether or not a given 
state’s franchise regulations apply.  For exceptions, see Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra 
note 8 (discussing the effect of contractual choice of law and forum on the applicability 
of state franchise regulation); Klick et al., supra note 7 (empirical evidence on the 
effect of contractual waivers, choice of forum and choice of law).  See also Christopher 
R. Drahozal & Keith N. Hylton, The Economics of Litigation and Arbitration: An 
Application to Franchise Contracts, 32 J. LEG. STUD. 549 (2003) (discussing use of 
arbitration clauses). 
39 See infra Table 2. 
40 See infra Section IV. 
41 Id. 
42 See Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 8.  See generally, Larry E. Ribstein, From 
Efficiency to Politics in Contractual Choice of Law, 37 GA. L. REV. 363 (2003). 
43 See generally, Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of 
Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541 (2003). 
44 Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 8. 
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wealth transfers from out of state to in state parties.45  Whether such 
regulatory competition is effective depends significantly on the parties’ 
cost-of-exit from a given state,46 which, in turn, depends on whether the 
states allow the parties to contract for the applicable court or law.  
It follows that there is an important question as to how and to what 
extent states allow parties to exercise contractual exit from franchise 
statutes. Most obviously, the states could explicitly allow the contracting 
parties to enter into an enforceable agreement waiving the statute.  This is 
unlikely for franchise regulation, however, because the whole purpose of 
the regulation is to protect franchisees from contract provisions favorable to 
franchisors.  Indeed, many of the state statutes contain explicit anti-waiver 
provisions.47   
Still, the parties can skirt such anti-waiver provisions through 
alternative contract clauses.48  In particular, the parties can provide that the 
contract is to be interpreted and enforced under the law of a state that does 
not regulate franchise termination. It may not be clear whether these 
provisions are prohibited by statutory anti-waiver provisions, even if they 
have a similar effect.   
The standards the courts apply to these issues are summarized in 
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 187(2).  It provides that a 
choice-of-law clause will not be enforced as to issues such as validity 
(when the choice of law matters most) if there is no “substantial 
relationship” between the chosen law and the parties or transaction or other 
“reasonable basis” for the parties’ choice, or application of the chosen law 
would contravene a “fundamental policy” of a state with a materially 
greater interest whose law would apply in the absence of an effective choice 
of law by the parties.49  Thus, whether a court will enforce a choice-of-law 
clause depends on the contacts between the parties and the transaction, on 
one hand, and the chosen jurisdiction on the other, whether a state with 
closer contacts seeks to regulate the transaction, and on the nature of the 
regulation.50 
The flexibility of these tests leaves the forum court significant 
leeway in deciding whether to enforce the choice-of-law clause. These rules 
suggest that the parties might maximize the chance that the clause will be 
enforced by adding a forum-selection clause to the agreement providing 
that the dispute will be decided in a particular court that has a general rule 
                                                          
45 Id.  
46 See generally, Richard A. Epstein, Exit Rights Under Federalism, 55 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROB. 147 (1992); Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local 
Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956); BRUCE H. KOBAYASHI AND LARRY E. 
RIBSTEIN, ECONOMICS OF FEDERALISM (Edward Elgar 2007). 
47 See infra Table 2. 
48 Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 8. 
49 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2) (2008). 
50 Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 8.  
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favoring enforcement or that is otherwise inclined to enforce the parties’ 
choice-of-law clause.51  The vast majority of jurisdictions have a general 
policy favoring enforcement of choice-of-forum clauses.52 Enforceability 
also has been supported by the U.S. Supreme Court,53 although these 
opinions on federal issues are not necessarily binding in state courts on state 
issues.  One reason for the somewhat different judicial approaches to 
choice-of-forum and choice-of-law clauses is that a court does not have to 
clearly disregard local law or the law of another regulating state to hold 
simply that the case should be brought in the designated forum.54  Another 
is that enforcing a choice-of-law clause might force a court to apply the law 
of another jurisdiction with which it may be unfamiliar and on which its 
decision would not have precedential value.55  The parties’ might further 
enhance the chance of enforcing the forum-selection clause with a clause 
providing that the parties’ consent to jurisdiction in the designated forum.56  
Because courts’ flexibility is limited, enforcing the parties’ choice-
of-forum clause does not necessarily mean that the chosen forum will 
enforce the parties’ contractual choice of law.  Thus, a state law recognizing 
enforcement of choice-of-law clauses is more permissive than a state law 
recognizing enforcement only of choice-of-forum clauses. 
Finally, the parties can enhance enforcement of the choice-of-law 
clause by establishing connections with the designated state.  As noted 
above, under the general rules on enforcement of contractual choice of law, 
enforcement is more likely where the parties and transaction have a 
“substantial relationship” with the designated state, and where a regulating 
state does not have a “materially greater interest” than the designated 
state.57  
Applying these rules to franchise cases, an important impetus to the 
enforcement of choice-of-forum and choice-of-law clauses in franchise 
contracts was the Supreme Court's decision in Burger King enforcing a 
clause in a franchise agreement by which the franchisee consented to 
jurisdiction in Florida.58  The court held that the franchisee had established 
“minimum contacts” with Florida, and had agreed to a contract that had 
“substantial connections with the forum state,” including a provision that 
provided for application of Florida law.  As a result, the Michigan 
Franchise Investment Law, which required cause for termination and gave 
                                                          
51 Id. 
52 Michael E. Solimine, An Economic and Empirical Analysis of Choice of Law, 24 GA. 
L. REV. 49 (1989). 
53 M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972); Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. 
v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991). 
54 Ribstein, supra note 42. 
55 Id. 
56 Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985). 
57 Ribstein, supra note42. 
58 Burger King, supra note 53. 
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the franchisee thirty days to cure any defects, did not govern the 
relationship.59   
Following this decision were two cases in the late 1980's that 
enforced choice-of-law clauses. Tele-Save, decided by the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, upheld a contractual choice-of-law provision 
choosing New Jersey Law despite a non-waiver provision found in the Ohio 
Business Opportunity Plans Act.60  Modern Computer Systems, decided by 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, held that a choice-of-
forum clause requiring "exclusive venue in Douglas County Nebraska in 
any litigation between them concerning this contract" precluded application 
of the Minnesota Franchise Act in spite of the existence of an anti-waiver 
provision in the statute.61   
These holdings effectively enabled a franchisor to avoid franchise 
regulation if it included a choice-of-law clause in the franchise contract and 
established significant contacts with the designated state, or avoided 
contacts with the regulating state, or both. These opinions established legal 
rules for fourteen of the state statutes that existed as of the late 1980's, 
which included a large percentage of the states that have enacted franchise 
regulations, including the particularly oppressive laws in Iowa, Minnesota 
and Arkansas in the Eighth Circuit, and Michigan in the Sixth Circuit.   
On the other hand, some courts have voided contractual choice-of-
law clauses even where the relevant statute did not specifically bar the 
clause.  Examples include Electrical & Magneto in the Eighth Circuit62 and 
Wright-Moore in the Seventh Circuit,63 which directly cover franchise 
statutes in Illinois, Wisconsin and Indiana.  Wright-Moore failed to find a 
substantial relationship to the forum state, noting that although Ricoh was 
incorporated in New York, its principal place of business was New Jersey.  
Also, in contrast to the holding in Modern that the franchisee's domicile 
(Minnesota) had expressed a strong preference for upholding contractual 
choice of law, the court in Wright-Moore did not find such an expression by 
Indiana. 
Some state legislators swiftly reacted to these federal decisions.  
Soon after the Eighth Circuit's decision in Modern Computer Systems, the 
Minnesota legislature passed a provision explicitly voiding choice-of-law 
provisions in franchise contracts by adding the phrase “including any 
choice of law provision” to the section voiding waivers.64 However, there is 
                                                          
59 Id.  For a description of the Michigan Franchise Investment Law, see Table 1, supra. 
60 Tele-Save Merchandising Co. v. Consumers Distributing Company, Ltd., 814 F.2d 
1120 (6th Cir. 1987). 
61 Modern Computer Systems, Inc. v. Modern Banking Systems, Inc., 871 F.2d 734 (8th 
Cir. 1989). 
62 Electrical & Magneto Service Co. Inc. v. AMBAC Intern. Corp., 941 F.2d 660 (8th 
Cir. 1991). 
63 Wright-Moore v. Ricoh, 908 F.2d 128 (7th Cir. 1991). 
64 MINN. STAT. § 80C.21 (2008). 
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significant variation in the states’ responses.  Since 1988, six states have 
explicitly voided choice-of-forum or choice-of-law clauses.  Only two, 
Washington and Iowa, void both types of provisions. The California, 
Illinois and Michigan statutes have provisions voiding choice-of-forum 
provisions but not choice-of-law provisions. Meanwhile, the Minnesota 
statute explicitly voids choice-of-law provisions but does not explicitly void 
choice-of-forum provisions.  
 
 Table 2 - Statutory Restrictions on Waiver, Choice of Forum, Choice of Law, 
and Applicability 
States that Regulate the Franchisor/Franchisee Relationship 
 
 
JURISDICTION RESTRICTION 
ON WAIVER 
RESTRICTION 
ON CHOICE OF 
FORUM 
RESTRICTION 
ON CHOICE OF 
LAW 
RESTRICTION ON 
APPLICABILITY 
CT  
(2nd Circuit) 
 
GEN. STAT. @ 
42-133f (f)  
1975 
NONE NONE GEN. ST @ 42.133h 
FRANCHISE IN-
STATE 
 NJ 
(3rd Circuit) 
 
NJSA @ 56:10-
7(A) 
1971 
NONE NONE NJSA @ 56:10-4 
FRANCHISE IN-
STATE 
DE 
(3rd Circuit) 
 
NONE NONE NONE 6 DEL. C. @ 2551 
FRANCHISE IN-
STATE 
VA 
(4th Circuit) 
 
VA ST @ 13.1-
571 
1972 
NONE NONE VA ST. s 13.1-559 
FRANCHISE IN-
STATE 
MI 
(6th Circuit) 
 
MCLA @ 
445.1527  (27b) 
1974 
 
MCLA @ 
445.1527  (27f) 
1988 
NONE MCLA @ 445.1504 
OFFER ORIGINATES 
OR RECEIVED IN 
STATE OR 
FRANCHISE IN 
STATE 
TN 
(6th Circuit) 
TCA 47-25-1507 
1989 
NONE TCA 47-25-1510 
1989 
NONE 
IN 
(7th Circuit) 
IN. ST. @ 23-2-
2.7-1(5) 
1976 
 
NONE NONE IN. ST. 23-2-2.7-1 
FRANCHISE IN-
STATE OR RESIDENT 
OF IN 
WI 
(7th Circuit) 
 
WSA @ 135.025 
Effective 
11/24/77 
NONE NONE WSA @ 135.02 
FRANCHISE IN-
STATE 
IL 
(7th Circuit) 
 
815 ILCS @ 
705/41 
1988 
815 ILCS @ 
705/4 
1988 
NONE 815 ILCS @ 7-5/19-20 
FRANCHISE IN-
STATE 
AR  
(8th Circuit) 
 
ASA @ 4-72-
206(1)  
1977 
NONE NONE ASA @ 4-72-203 
FRANCHISEE IN-
STATE 
MN 
(8th Circuit) 
 
 
MSA @ 80C.21 
1973 
 
NONE MSA @ 80C.21 
1989 
MSA @ 80C.19 
OFFER ORIGINATES 
OR RECEIVED IN 
STATE OR 
FRANCHISE IN 
STATE  
MO 
(8th Circuit) 
 
NONE NONE NONE MO. ST. 407.400 
FRANCHISE IN-
STATE  
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IA 
(8th Circuit) 
ICA @ 523H.4 
1992 
ICA @ 523H.3(1) 
1992 
ICA @523H.14 
1992 
ICA @ 523H.2 
FRANCHISE IN 
STATE 
WA 
(9th Circuit) 
 
RWCA @ 
19.100.220 
1971 
RWCA  @ 
19.100.220 
1991 
RWCA  @ 
19.100.220 
1991 
RWCA 19.100.160 
ANY PERSON 
ENGAGED IN OFFER 
TO SELL OR IN 
BUSINESS 
DEALINGS 
CA  
(9th Circuit) 
 
 
BUS. & PROF. 
CODE @ 20010  
1980, (operative 
1/1/1981) 
 
BUS & PROF. 
CODE @ 20040.5 
1994 
NONE BUS & PROF. CODE 
@ 20015 
FRANCHISEE  
DOMICILED OR 
FRANCHISE  
OPERATED IN-
STATE 
HI 
(9th Circuit) 
HRS @ 482E-
6(F)1974 
NONE NONE NONE 
NE 
(10th Circuit) 
 
RRS NEB. @ 
87-406 
1978 
NONE NONE RRS NEB. @ 87.403 
FRANCHISE IN-
STATE 
MS 
(11th Circuit) 
NONE NONE NONE NONE 
DC 
(DC Circuit) 
NONE NONE NONE NONE 
 
Moreover, the state legislative response still permits enforcement of 
contractual choice-of-law clauses even in the states that have enacted 
specific anti-choice provisions. This is because the application of these 
statutes depends on the places of business of the franchisee and franchisor.  
For example, in JRT the Eighth Circuit held valid the contractual choice of 
Arkansas law, and affirmed the district court’s judgment, which dismissed 
or granted summary judgment on the plaintiff's claims based on the 
Michigan Franchise Investment Law.65  The Arkansas Franchise Law can 
be used only by a franchisee that maintains a place of business in Arkansas.  
Even without this statutory provision, the regulation might not apply to a 
franchisor because of a lack of a “substantial relationship” between the 
regulating state and the parties or transaction under the standards of 
Restatement (Second) of Conflicts §187(2).66 Franchisors, therefore, can 
minimize the impact of state franchise regulations by locating franchises 
only in non-regulating states and by locating headquarters either in non-
regulating states or in regulating states that apply their provisions only to 
in-state franchisees. 
 
 
                                                          
65 JRT v. TCBY Yogurt, 52 F.3d 734 (8th. Cir. 1995). 
66 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 (2008). 
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Table 3 - Applicable State Franchise Termination Laws  
by Franchisor's Principal Place of Business and Franchisee’s State 
 
Franchisor’s Principal Place of Business and Contractual Choice of Law 
 
 
Franchisee’s 
State  
(Circuit): 
Non-
Reg. 
State 
AR 
(8) 
CA 
(9) 
CT 
(2) 
DE 
(3) 
HI 
(9) 
IA 
(8) 
IL 
(7) 
IN 
(7) 
MI 
(6) 
MN 
(8) 
NE 
(8) 
NJ 
(3) 
TN 
(6) 
VA 
(4) 
WA 
(9) 
WI 
(7) 
Non Reg. 
State: 
N  
(5) 
N  
(1) 
N  
(1) 
N N N N  
(1) 
N  N  N/y 
(H,I) 
N/y N  
(1) 
N  
(1) 
N/y 
 
N N/y N  
AR(8) 
 
N  
(2,B) 
AR 
 
N  N N N N  
(1,2) 
S  S  N/y 
(2) 
N/y N  N  N N N/y S  
CA(9) 
 
N  
(2,C) 
N  
 (2,B) 
CA 
 
- - -/y N  
 (2,B) 
Y  
(O) 
Y  N/y N/y N  
(2,B) 
-  N/y -/y -/y Y  
CT (2) 
 
N N - CT - - N Y Y N N N - N - - Y 
DE (3) 
 
N N - - DE - N Y Y N N N - N - - Y 
HI (9) 
 
N N - - - HI N S S N N N - N - - Y 
IA(8) 
 
Y 
(4) 
Y 
(4) 
Y  
(4) 
Y  
(4) 
Y  
(4) 
Y  
(4) 
IA Y 
(4) 
Y 
(4) 
Y 
(4) 
Y 
(4) 
Y 
(4) 
Y 
(4) 
Y  
(4) 
Y  
(4) 
Y 
(4) 
Y 
(4) 
IL(7) S  S  Y  Y Y Y S  IL 
 
Y  S/y 
(3,D) 
S/y S  Y  S Y Y  Y  
IN(7) 
 
S  
(3,F) 
S  Y  Y Y Y S  Y  IN 
 
S/y S/y S  Y  S/y Y Y  Y  
MI(6) 
 
N  
(2) 
N  
(1,2,E) 
N  N N N N  
(1,2) 
S  S  
 
MI N/y N  
(1,2) 
N  N N N/y S  
MN(8) 
 
Y 
(4.L) 
Y 
(4,J) 
Y 
(4) 
Y  
(4) 
Y  
(4) 
Y  
(4) 
Y 
(4) 
Y 
(4) 
Y 
(4) 
Y 
(4) 
MN Y 
(4,E) 
Y 
(4) 
Y  
(4) 
Y  
(4) 
Y 
(4) 
Y 
(4) 
NE(8) 
 
N  
(2,B) 
N  
(2,B) 
N  N N N N  
(2,B) 
S  S  N/y 
(2) 
N/y NE N  N N N/y S  
NJ(3) 
 
N N  -/y -/y -/y -/y N  Y  Y  N/y N/y N  NJ N/y -/y -/y Y  
TN (6) Y 
(4) 
Y 
(4) 
Y 
(4) 
Y 
(4) 
Y 
(4) 
Y 
(4) 
Y 
(4) 
Y 
(4) 
Y 
(4) 
Y 
(4) 
Y 
(4) 
Y 
(4) 
Y 
(4) 
TN Y 
(4) 
Y 
(4) 
Y 
(4) 
VA (4) 
 
N N - - - - N Y Y N N N - N VA - Y 
WA(9) 
 
Y 
(4) 
Y 
(4) 
Y 
(4,K) 
Y 
(4) 
Y 
(4) 
Y 
(4) 
Y 
(4) 
Y 
(4) 
Y 
(4) 
Y 
(4) 
Y 
(4) 
Y 
(4) 
Y 
(4) 
Y 
(4) 
Y 
(4) 
WA Y 
(4) 
WI(7) 
 
S 
(3,F) 
S Y Y Y Y S Y Y S S S Y S Y Y WI 
  
 
Table Entries: 
 
Y - Franchise Law of Franchisee’s State applies. 
Y - One Circuit has voided Choice of Law Clause 
N - Both Circuits have Enforced Choice of Law Clause, or No Franchise Law 
Exists in Franchisee State 
N - One Circuit has Enforced Choice of Law Clause. 
S - One Circuit has Enforced Choice of Law, Other has not. 
/y - Franchise Law of Franchisor’s State may apply to out of state franchisee. 
 
Notes: 
 
1 Franchise statute does not apply to out-of-state franchisee by statute (See Table 3) 
2 Contractual choice of law enforced over general waiver in the absence of explicit 
anti-choice of law clause 
3 General waiver voids contractual choice of law or forum 
4 Explicit anti-choice of law clause voids contractual choice of law 
5 No regulations apply in either state. 
 
Specific Cases: 
 
 2009] Federalism, Variation, and State Regulation of Franchise 
Termination 
 
 
 
373 
A Modern Computer Systems v. Modern Banking, 871 F.2d 734 (8th Cir. 1989) 
(applied contractual choice of NE law over Minnesota Franchise Act (MFA), but 
prior to amendment adding explicit anti-COL clause to MFA).  DeLaria v. KFC 
Corp., 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21516 at *17 (D. Minn) (interpreting amendment to 
MFA as legislative response to Modern). 
B Following Eighth Circuit holdings in Modern Computer and JRT upholding 
contractual choice absent specific provisions in statute. 
C Cottman Transmission System v. Melody, 869 F. Supp. 1180 (E.D. Pa. 1994) 
(upholding contractual choice of Pennsylvania Law over California Franchise 
Regulation). 
D Hengel, Inc. v. Hot N’ Now, 825 F. Supp. 1311 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (Franchisor 
successfully argues that its choice of MI law is void to avoid application of 
Michigan Franchise Investment  Law (MFIL) by a IL franchisee – waiver provision 
in ILCS invalidates contractual choice of MI law); See also To-Am Equipment Co., 
Inc. v. Mitsubishi Caterpillar Forklift America, Inc., 152 F.3d 658 (C.A.7 (Ill.) 
1998); Bixby's Food Systems, Inc. v. McKay 193 F.Supp.2d 1053 (N.D. Ill. 2002); 
Healy v. Carlson Travel Network Associates, Inc. 227 F.Supp.2d 1080 (D. Minn. 
2002) (ILCS applied over Minnesota Franchise Statute for IL franchisee with MN 
choice of law). 
E JRT v. TCBY Yogurt, 52 F.3d 734 (C.A.8. (Ark.) 1995) (Enforced choice of AR 
law over MFIL; AR Franchise law does not apply to MI franchisee). 
F Wright-Moore v. Ricoh, 908 F.2d 128 (7th Cir. 1990) (Applying IN franchise 
statute over choice of NY law). Morley-Murphy Co. v. Zenith Elec. Corp., 142 F.3d 
373, 381 (7th Cir. 1998) (Wisconsin law). 
G Electrical & Magneto Service Co. v. AMBAC, 941 F.2d 660 (8th Cir. 1991) 
(applying MO franchise law over choice of SC law). 
H Banek v. Yogurt Ventures, 6 F.3d 357 (6th Cir. 1993) (Enforcing choice of GA 
law, dismissing claims under MFIL). 
I Tele-Save Merch. V. Consumers Dist. Co., 814 F.2d 1120 (6th Cir. 1987).  
J TCBY v. RSP, 33 F.3d 925 (8th Cir. 1994) (Enforced choice of AK law, dismissing 
claims under MFA because anti-choice of law clause did not apply retroactively). 
K Rutter v. BX of Tri-Cities, Inc., 806 P.2d 1266 (C.A. Wash. 1991) (Apply WA 
Franchise Law over choice of CA law). 
L Carlock et al., v. Pillsbury, 719 F. Supp. 791 (D. Minn. 1989) (uphold choice of 
NY law over MFA). 
M Tri-County Retreading v. Bandag, Inc., 851 S.W. 2d 780 (C.A. Mo. 1993) 
(upholding choice of IA law). 
N Flynn Beverage Inc., v. Joseph E. Segram & Sons, 815 F. Supp. 1174 (C.D. Ill., 
1993) (applying IL law over choice of law). 
O Great Frame-Up Syst., Inc. v. Jazayeri Ent., 789 F. Supp. 253 (N.D. Ill. 1992) 
(Apply CA statute over choice of IL law). 
Volvo Const. Equipment North America, Inc. v. CLM Equipment Company, Inc., 
386 F.3d 581 (C.A.4 (N.C.) 2004) (Finding that AR waiver provision was 
fundamental policy (based on legislative statement), but LA was not (no antiwaiver 
provision)). 
Cromeens, Holloman, Sibert, Inc v. AB Volvo, 349 F.3d 376 (C.A.7 (Ill.) 2003) 
(finding anti-waiver fundamental public policy of Maine based on legislative 
statement). 
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V. THE EFFECT OF TERMINATION RESTRICTIONS 
 
In empirical work we sought to address the shortcomings of the 
earlier work on franchise termination regulation.67 This analysis exploits 
two new sources of panel data to analyze the effects of laws restricting 
franchisor termination rights, allowing us to avoid the limitations present in 
prior studies that relied on cross-sectional data.  We also explicitly examine 
the effect of variation in states’ statutory treatment of contractual choice-of-
law and choice-of-forum clauses.   
Our first set of empirical tests used newly collected firm-level 
UFOC data on franchising in the fast-food industry to examine the effect of 
the most recently enacted franchise legislation in Iowa.  Because of data 
limitations, this data covers the period only from 1989-2001,68 when only 
one new statute, in Iowa, was passed.  Enacted in 1992, the Iowa statute is 
uniformly regarded as the most unfavorable to franchisors.69  In addition to 
preventing termination at will, it requires that franchisors allow franchisees 
a right to cure defects, it restricts encroachment, and it explicitly restricts 
waiver and enforcement of contractual choice-of-law and choice-of-forum 
clauses.  Our results show that the passage of this statute led to a reduction 
in both the number of franchised units and the total number of chain 
outlets.70  In other words, the increase in the number of franchisor-operated 
establishments did not offset the decrease in the number of franchised 
outlets.   
While data limitations do not allow us to examine the issue of 
contractual avoidance of the statute, these results illustrate how a measure 
of overall activity level (i.e., the number of total outlets in a given state) can 
be used to measure the effects of a franchise regulation.  In order to 
measure the effects of other state law changes, including parties’ ability to 
bargain over whether the franchise regulations apply, we analyze a second 
dataset that uses state employment in industries characterized by a high 
degree of franchising as a proxy for the overall franchisor activity level.71  
This dataset, from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, contains data from 
                                                          
67 Klick et al., supra note 7. 
68 Id. 
69 See Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 8, at 339. 
70 Klick et al., supra note 7 at Tables 2 & 3. 
71 Id.  Specifically, we collected data on the proportion of employees in a state 
employed in four SIC codes that historically have a relatively high rate of franchising.  
These include automotive dealers and service stations (624), eating and drinking places 
(627), hotels and other lodging places (805), and automotive repair, services, and 
parking (825). In addition, to allow us to control for variables that are coincidentally 
correlated with the enactment of franchise termination that affect employment in 
franchising industries, we also collected data on the proportion of employees in a state 
employed in four SIC codes where there was a low rate of franchising. These include 
contractors (310), lumber products (413), textiles (462), and depository institutions 
(710).  
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1969 to 2000.  Because the dataset covers the period when all nineteen 
statutes listed in Table 1 were enacted, it is rich enough to analyze the 
contractual avoidance issue.72   
Using this data, we find that employment in franchise industries, as 
a proportion of total employment, drops significantly when states enact 
restrictions on franchisor termination rights.73  The negative effect is larger 
in industries that typically do not have repeat business, bolstering the 
inference that the statutes limit franchisors' ability to police franchisee 
opportunism.74  These results complement the direct test based on the 
UFOC data, which supports the view that these termination statutes serve to 
reduce overall activity in franchise industries.  
We find that statutory variations as to whether the parties can 
directly waive their application or effectively contract over the applicable 
law or forum are important. Controlling for these variables, termination 
restrictions, by themselves, do little to affect behavior.  But termination 
restrictions coupled with restrictions on the franchisee’s ability to waive its 
rights have a significant and negative effect on franchising.  Specifically, 
we find that the effect on employment is larger when states restrict the 
parties’ ability to contract around these restrictions through waiver, choice-
of-law, and choice-of-forum clauses.75  
 The prior empirical literature franchising has generally ignored 
state-by-state substantive variation in the statutes.  One exception is Muris 
& Beales, who examined the additional effect of statutory provisions that 
give franchisees a right to cure violations on the franchise/own decision.76  
As noted above,77 eleven states with franchise-termination restrictions also 
require that a franchisor permit the franchisee to cure any problem offered 
as cause for terminating their relationship.  Because giving the franchisee a 
right to cure further limits the franchisor’s ability to discipline franchisee 
opportunism, such statutory restrictions should have a marginal effect on 
the franchise-versus-own decision. Like the Brickley et al. study, the Muris 
& Beales study was based on cross-sectional data collected by the 
Department of Commerce.78  In contrast to the findings in Brickley et al.,79 
Muris & Beales found that the right to cure had negative and significant 
effects in both repeat and non-repeat industries, though the largest negative 
effects on franchising were in non-repeat industries, concentrated in states 
where the statute mandated a franchisee right to cure.   
                                                          
72Id. 
73 Id. at Table 6. 
74 Id. at Table 7; see also Brickley et al., supra note 3. 
75 Klick et al., supra note 7 at Tables 8-9. 
76 Timothy J. Muris & J. Howard Beales III, State Regulation of Franchise Contracts, 
unpublished manuscript, (1994). 
77 See Table 1. 
78 See discussion in supra note 36. 
79 Brickley et al., supra note 3. 
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These results suggest that the right to cure is an important statutory 
variation, and it may be an important factor in determining the effect of 
franchise regulations.  Table 5 reports the results of regressions that 
investigate the effect of a right to cure using the employment panel data set 
from Klick et al.80  To estimate the effects of franchise regulations on 
employment in franchise industries, we performed a difference-in-
difference-in-difference (“DDD”) analysis in which we independently 
control for state-specific year dummies (υ) to net out any unobservable 
variables that affect this segment of the workforce.  Additionally, we 
control for industry-specific state fixed effects (λ) and industry-specific 
year dummies (τ) generating the following regression:  
 
∑ +++= j stitisjistj
st
ist law
employment
employment υτλα  
 
where i represents the industry, s stands for the state, and t is the year.81 
We identify the effects of franchise termination laws by examining 
changes in the portion of the state’s workforce in franchising industries 
when termination laws are adopted.  This change is reflected in the 
coefficient of the law variables, and is measured relative to non-franchising 
industries in the same state and year.  This change is also net of any existing 
baseline within the state and any contemporaneous changes in franchising 
industries in states without termination laws.  In regressions that do not take 
into account substantive variation in termination laws, there is a single law 
variable that equals one if the state s in year t has a franchise termination 
statute in effect.   Our approach allows for multiple law variables to take 
into account state variation. 
 
 Table 4 
Effect of Cure Requirement in Franchising Relationship 
 
(robust standard errors in parentheses) 
[standard errors clustered by state in brackets] 
 Results without 
Effect of Cure 
Requirement 
Average 
Incremental 
Effect of Cure 
Requirement 
Effect of Cure 
Requirement 
Interacted with 
Other Contract 
Restrictions 
Termination 
Restriction and 
Cure Requirement 
Only 
Termination -0.00012 0.00039 0.00141 -0.00051 
                                                          
80 Klick et al., supra note 7. 
81 We estimate this equation using weighted least squares where each observation is 
weighted by the total labor force in the state. In this regression, the law variables only 
take the value of one in states with termination laws for those industries assumed to 
have a high degree of franchising, in order to avoid collinearity with the state year 
dummies.  In addition, we use robust standard errors to allow for heteroskedasticity 
across states.  We also provide standard errors that are clustered by state to mitigate 
concerns about serial correlation. 
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Restriction Only (0.00027) 
[0.00090] 
(0.00031) 
[0.00086] 
 
(0.00050)*** 
[0.00062]** 
(0.00024)** 
[0.00073] 
Termination 
Restriction and Cure 
Requirement Only 
-- -- -0.00087 
(0.00034)*** 
[0.00093] 
-- 
    
Termination and 
Waiver Restriction 
Only 
-0.00107 
(0.00023)*** 
[0.00071] 
-0.00059 
(0.00026)** 
[0.00075] 
 
-0.00141 
(0.00039)*** 
[0.00084] 
-- 
Termination and 
Waiver Restriction 
and Cure Requirement 
Only 
-- -- -0.00122 
(0.00029)*** 
[0.00100] 
-- 
    
Termination, Waiver, 
and either COL or 
COF Restriction 
-0.00204 
(0.00028)*** 
[0.00101]** 
-0.00145 
(0.00032)*** 
[0.00095] 
-0.00102 
(0.00033)*** 
[0.00101] 
-- 
    
Termination, Waiver, 
and COL or COF 
Restriction and Cure 
Requirement 
-- -- -0.00229 
(0.00032)*** 
[0.00118]* 
-- 
    
Termination, Waiver, 
and COL and COF 
Restriction 
-0.00306 
(0.00042)*** 
[0.00132]** 
-0.00222 
(0.00047)*** 
[0.00118]* 
-- -- 
    
Termination, Waiver, 
and COL and COF 
Restriction and Cure 
Requirement 
-- -- -0.00288 
(0.00041)*** 
[0.00134]** 
-- 
    
Cure Requirement -- -0.00083 
(0.00033)** 
[0.00107] 
-- -0.00123 
(0.00031)*** 
[0.00102] 
Note:  Weighted least squares regressions are presented; each observation is 
weighted by total state employment.  All regressions include Industry-specific 
year and state effects, as well as state-specific year effects.  These are not 
reported for expositional clarity. 
R2 = .980 
***p < 0.01; **p < 0.05; *p < 0.10 (two-sided test of null hypothesis that 
coefficient equals 0). 
 
Table 4 reports several regressions that examine state variation in 
franchise protections statutes.  The results in column 1 show the effect of 
contractual waiver, choice-of-law, and choice-of-forum provisions reported 
in Klick et al.82  As discussed supra, permitting enforcement of these 
provisions increases the contracting parties’ ability to avoid regulation.  
This analysis shows the importance of taking these contractual variations 
into account when measuring the effect of regulation.  The results in 
Column 1 show that termination restrictions alone have very little effect on 
                                                          
82 See Klick et al. supra note 7 at Table 8, column 2. 
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the employment share of franchise industries.  The coefficient on the 
“termination restriction only” variable is small in magnitude and is not 
statistically significant.  Adding a “waiver restriction” variable increases the 
negative effect of the termination by a factor of ten.  And adding either a 
“choice of law” or “choice of forum restriction” variable doubles the 
negative effect generated by the waiver restriction.  This effect is 
statistically significant using robust standard errors and using standard 
errors clustered by state.  Finally, states that restrict both choice-of-law and 
choice-of-forum have the largest negative effect on employment. 
The second column of Table 4 provides estimates from re-running 
the above regression, adding an additional variable that equals one for 
franchise industries operating in states that have a cure requirement in a 
given year.  In this specification, we do find a negative average treatment 
effect for the cure requirement.  The effect is statistically significant at the 
five percent level with robust standard errors, but is not statistically 
significant when standard errors are clustered by state.   
We also present a specification in column 3 that interacts the cure 
requirement indicator with each of the various groupings of state 
contractual restrictions (i.e., termination restriction only, termination and 
waiver restrictions only, termination, waiver, and either COL or COF 
restrictions only, and all of the restrictions).  We again find evidence that 
the cure requirement independently reduces the employment share of 
franchising industries and, in general, that this effect is larger in magnitude 
as states adopt more restrictions on the parties’ ability to contract around 
state law. The last column of Table 5 examines the effect of cure in the 
absence of the contractual avoidance variables, and is closest to the Muris 
& Beales results.83  The regression results show that a right to cure 
marginally increases the negative effect of the franchise termination 
statutes.  The effect is statistically significant with robust standard errors, 
but neither of the variables’ coefficients are significant with standard errors 
clustered by state.  
  
V. CONCLUSION 
 
 Prior empirical studies of franchise termination regulations show 
that those regulations reduce the use of franchising.  These studies, in 
effect, assume that franchise regulations have uniform effects on 
franchising.  In this paper, we argue that such an approach ignores 
significant variation in states’ approaches to franchise regulation.  We show 
that a state’s approach to allowing parties contractually to avoid regulation 
is a significant factor in determining the actual effect of regulation, and 
should be taken into account by policy makers and by those analyzing the 
effects of state regulation. We also provide evidence that the substantive 
                                                          
83 Muris & Beales, supra note 79. 
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provisions of franchise regulation statutes, such as the right to cure, can 
have important effects in determining the impact of the regulation. 
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